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An Investigation of Monitoring Frequency and Slack Allowance on Reporting Honesty  
ABSTRACT 
 Businesses that use participative budgeting commonly face the problem of subordinates 
introducing budgetary slack into the planning process in a manner that harms the organization. 
This study examines budgetary reporting behavior in response to two key features of a 
monitoring system, the frequency of monitoring (increasing versus decreasing) and thresholds in 
a monitoring system that determine an allowable level of budgetary slack (low versus high slack 
allowance). Based on prior theory and literature, we develop hypotheses and research questions 
regarding the effects of these monitoring features on subordinates’ slack creation. We test our 
predictions in a multiple-round experimental setting that uses economic incentives. Participants’ 
actions are consistent with the strategic creation of slack to maximize wealth (to the extent 
permitted given the constraints of the monitoring system) rather than preferences for honesty. Of 
the monitoring systems imposed, a low slack allowance combined with high monitoring 
frequency that decreases over time is most effective in reducing slack creation. 
 






 This study examines how monitoring strategies affect managerial honesty in a 
participative budgeting setting. Many organizations use participative budgeting to efficiently 
coordinate cost communications between subordinates and the organization (Brown, Evans, and 
Moser 2009). Subordinate managers often have private information that can benefit the 
organization. Organizations expect subordinates to efficiently utilize resources in a manner that 
is most beneficial to the organization; this, however, may be counter to the interests of local 
management. It is possible that subordinate management may take advantage of information 
asymmetry in order to benefit themselves through the self-interested creation of budgetary slack.  
 Prior literature finds that introducing information systems that reduce information 
asymmetry, such as formal controls and monitoring, can have mixed success in influencing 
subordinate behavior (e.g., Abdel-Rahim and Stevens 2018; Hannan, Rankin, and Towry, 2006; 
Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 2003; Schatzberg and Stevens 2008). While such features can 
reduce slack creation, they can also cause subordinates to focus less on individual preferences for 
honesty and more on self-interests. Further, the way in which controls are implemented can 
effect subordinates’ perceptions of organizational intent. Negative reciprocity effects can then 
potentially motivate subordinates to engage in dysfunctional behavior (Christ 2013). Thus, care 
must be taken when implementing controls to ensure that subordinates’ responses are consistent 
with organizational objectives.   
The availability and variety of monitoring practices have increased in response to 
advances in technology and access to data. Companies may take advantage of such advances to 
implement automated formal controls, which present the possibility of increased monitoring 
frequency and/or rigor. However, organizational resources are often constrained, which limits the 
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time and money that can be devoted to variance investigations associated with the increased 
prevalence and magnitude of data that may emerge from automated monitoring practices. Thus, 
determinations must be made about many features of these systems, such as the frequency with 
which monitoring is imposed and rules underlying which variances will be investigated. This 
study examines how slack creation may be affected by two key elements that may occur in 
automated monitoring systems: changes in the frequency of monitoring and, if a review is 
conducted, the strictness of the threshold that determines whether slack creation will be 
penalized (i.e., the level of budgetary slack allowed by the system).  
 We test subordinates’ responses to changes in monitoring frequency and differing levels 
of slack allowance in an experimental setting. Participants assume the role of manager in a 
company and possess private information about the company’s actual costs. Any costs reported 
to the organization in excess of actual costs (i.e., budgetary slack) are initially retained by the 
manager. However, the manager’s report may be subject to a review, in which any slack created 
may be eliminated. The monitoring frequency (increased vs. decreased) and the slack allowance 
(high vs. low) are manipulated between participants. For the increased monitoring frequency 
treatment, participants experience 12 decision-making rounds where reviews occur with a low 
frequency (25 percent of rounds audited), followed by 12 decision-making rounds where reviews 
occur with high frequency (75 percent of rounds audited). Participants in the decreased 
frequency treatment experience the 12 high audit frequency rounds prior to the 12 low audit 
frequency rounds. If an audit occurs, participants in the high slack allowance condition are 
penalized by having their slack withdrawn if the slack exceeds 75 percent of the available slack 
in that round. Participants in the low slack allowance condition are penalized by having their 
slack withdrawn if the slack exceeds 25 percent of the available slack in that round.  
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 Results indicate that a low slack allowance combined with high monitoring frequency is 
most effective in reducing slack in the first 12 rounds. This effectiveness in slack reduction 
persists throughout the experiment, even when monitoring frequency decreases. Subordinates in 
the high slack allowance treatments significantly increase slack creation in the second set of 
rounds, regardless of whether monitoring frequency increases or decreases. However, 
subordinates in the low slack allowance treatments exhibit no significant change in the levels of 
slack created across the two sets of rounds. Overall, this pattern of results is consistent with the 
imposition of controls causing participants to create slack strategically rather than focus on 
preferences for honesty.  
This study has implications for organizations and internal auditors as they consider the 
most effective ways to implement auditing procedures with increased automation while 
balancing the costs and benefits of these procedures. With increasing information and affordable 
technologies available to organizations, many have begun to utilize automated auditing practices. 
Research indicates many potential benefits to the effective use of these practices. However, 
implementing automated auditing practices involves high costs of entry and ongoing costs (Kuhn 
and Sutton 2010). In addition, internal auditors may become overwhelmed by both the quantity 
and granularity of data available (Alles, Brennan, and Kogan 2006). Our results suggest that 
frequent, strict monitoring in early periods effectively reduces slack in early periods, and this 
behavior persists once monitoring decreases. Thus, it may be that implementing monitoring in a 




II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Budgetary Slack, Monitoring, and Controls  
Subordinate managers in a company often possess information about aspects of their 
local environment that is not known by their superiors. Involving subordinates in the budgeting 
and planning process enables them to use this information to benefit the company. However, 
subordinates may also use the private information to benefit themselves at the company’s 
expense. This agency conflict and factors that influence decision-making in participative 
budgeting settings have received much attention in the accounting literature (see Brown et al. 
2009 and Brink, Coats, and Rankin 2018 for reviews of the participative budgeting literature). 
Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser (2001) examine subordinates’ tendency to engage 
in self-interested wealth maximization through the creation of budgetary slack. Despite 
unambiguous incentives to create slack, Evans et al. (2001) find that subordinates exhibit 
preferences for honesty in that they do not always act in a purely self-interested manner by 
creating the maximum amount of budgetary slack. Mittendorf (2006) suggests that subordinates 
experience disutility from not reporting honestly; this disutility causes subordinates to limit their 
consumption of budgetary slack. The participative budgeting literature has built upon the 
straightforward setting used in Evans et al. (2001) to investigate the incremental impact on slack 
creation and managerial honesty of various features that may be present in the participative 
budgeting setting, such as the presence of information systems or monitoring controls. 
Prior literature indicates that monitoring and controls may have unanticipated negative 
consequences on managerial behaviors. Hannan, Rankin, and Towry (2006) examine the effects 
of information system presence and information system precision on subordinate honesty. They 
compare a system that delivers more precise information about subordinates’ honesty to a system 
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that delivers less precise information, which makes it more difficult for superiors to detect 
dishonesty. Even though the information system provides superiors with increased information 
about subordinate dishonesty, they must accept all cost reports. Thus, the information system 
affects subordinates’ ability to appear honest, while still permitting them to engage in slack 
creation. Hannan et al. (2006) find that subordinates choose to appear honest under a coarse (less 
precise) information system more often than they choose to report honestly under a fine (more 
precise) information system. Hannan et al. (2006) posit that precise information systems may 
lead to lower levels of honesty because subordinates’ marginal cost of appearing honest is higher 
under precise systems. Thus, it appears that strengthening an information system’s ability to 
reduce information asymmetry may not have the desired result of increasing honesty when the 
information system does not directly impact subordinates’ ability to create slack.  
Christ (2013) builds upon research that investigates the potential for formal controls to 
lead to dysfunctional behaviors. Specifically, she investigates the impact of controls on 
employees’ beliefs about management intentions. Christ draws on reciprocity theory to 
hypothesize that participants will be influenced by the intentionality of the control. Reciprocity is 
essentially a behavioral response to the perceived intent of an action (Christ 2013; Falk and 
Fischbacher 2006). If one party perceives another’s actions as having positive intent, then the 
first party reciprocates with positive behaviors. Conversely, actions perceived to have negative 
intent lead to negative reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). Christ (2013) finds, in her 
setting, that formal controls cause participants to negatively influence firm profit by exerting low 
effort when they interpret the intent of the control to be a signal of distrust. However, the formal 
control does not lead to negative consequences when participants are uncertain of the intentions 
underlying the control, or if they do not view the control as a signal of distrust.  
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Overall, the literature suggests that features designed to reduce the negative consequences 
of information asymmetry in participative budgeting settings should be designed with caution. 
Imposing controls or other forms of monitoring can have unintended adverse consequences on 
subordinates’ actions. Controls may reframe the reporting decision from that of a moral question 
to one of strategic interaction where subordinates’ incentives to act honestly are crowded out by 
incentives to act in a self-interested manner.  
Monitoring Frequency 
In the wake of the vastly publicized fraud case of WorldCom, as well as major frauds 
such as the Enron and HealthSouth management scandals, organizations increased their focus on 
more effective means of monitoring, such as automated auditing systems (Kuhn and Sutton 
2006; Alles, Kogan, and Vasarhelyi 2008). Improved technologies and increased access to data 
allow new approaches to measurement and reduce what would otherwise be manual work during 
the audit process (Vasarhelyi 2013). Companies may take advantage of such systems to increase 
the precision and frequency of monitoring through the use of real-time information, such as 
transactional data, inventory tracking, and video and image data. These practices have the 
potential to provide benefits to organizations.  
However, questions remain about the best ways to implement these practices and make 
use of available data and technology. Implementing automated auditing practices implies a 
change in monitoring frequency and/or intensity. When applied to the participative budgeting 
setting, increases in monitoring frequency may lead to reductions in budgetary slack and more 
accurate budgets. Webb (2002) finds that the presence of variance investigations decreases slack 
creation. Consistent with this, we posit that subordinates experiencing an increase in monitoring 
frequency will respond by decreasing slack. 
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H1: Subordinates who experience an increase in monitoring frequency will respond 
 by creating less slack than when monitoring frequency was lower. 
As companies continue to learn how to best take advantage of the increased ability to 
implement monitoring related to the prevalence of data, we may expect them to engage in a 
calibration process in which they explore various levels of monitoring frequency or monitoring 
strength. The question arises, therefore, regarding how subordinates will respond to increases 
and decreases in monitoring frequency. Prior literature highlights that the imposition of controls 
may be perceived as a signal of distrust from the organization, causing subordinates to 
reciprocate with adverse behaviors when possible (Frey 1993; Christ 2013). A decrease in 
monitoring frequency will naturally follow a period of higher monitoring frequency. The 
heightened salience of controls under a high monitoring frequency may deemphasize moral 
motivations, such as preferences for honesty. As a result, subordinates may strategically view a 
decrease in monitoring frequency as an opportunity to maximize wealth through greater slack 
creation. However, it is also possible that subordinates may interpret decreases in monitoring 
frequency as a signal of trust from the organization or a reward for previous good behavior. If so, 
they may reciprocate by reporting more honestly. This leads us to the following set of competing 
hypotheses: 
H2a: Subordinates who experience a decrease in monitoring frequency will respond 
opportunistically and create more slack than when monitoring frequency was high.  
H2b: Subordinates who experience a decrease in monitoring frequency will reciprocate 




The question arises as to whether, if possible, it would be in a company’s best interests to 
eliminate all budgetary slack. In practice, allowing some level of budgetary slack is useful for 
organizations. Slack provides management the flexibility to effectively cope with uncertainties, 
such as inflation or unanticipated adverse events (Merchant and Manzoni 1989; Lillis 2002; 
Davila and Wouters 2005). Slack can also facilitate innovation and experimentation (Van der 
Stede 2000). Davila and Wouters (2005) document an organization that successfully permitted 
budgetary slack to facilitate subordinates’ motivation and ability to achieve organizational goals. 
The organization purposefully implemented a control system that facilitated an acceptable level 
of slack. Specifically, in regard to certain budgets, small variances did not trigger intervention, 
although larger unexplained variances were investigated. This literature illustrates that 
organizations may find that some levels of budgetary slack are acceptable in practice. 
Further, costs associated with eliminating all slack may be prohibitive. As such, decisions 
must be made regarding how the organization will use information. One concern regarding the 
implementation of monitoring practices is the relation between the implementation strategy and 
investigation efficiency. For example, an organization may implement a new automated 
procedure which significantly increases the quantity of discrepancies internal auditors will have 
to investigate. This may result in the internal audit staff being overwhelmed with more potential 
incidents of misreporting than they can effectively manage (Alles et al. 2006). In addition, the 
increased rigor of testing may reduce efficiencies by requiring internal auditors to investigate 
situations that are essentially false positives – items the system flags that do not reflect error or 
misstatement. Similar to the organization in Davila and Wouters (2005), one potential strategy to 
manage inefficiency is to set materiality thresholds that establish cutoffs for items discovered in 
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the monitoring process that will result in further action. In a budgeting setting, this may translate 
to setting a level of slack the organization will allow. 
Slack Allowance and Hurdle Rates  
The notion of setting an acceptable level of slack is related to the concept of hurdle rates. 
Antle and Eppen (1985) describe the use of hurdle rates in contracts to manage budgetary slack. 
In the typical hurdle rate contract, the subordinates’ cost report is accepted if the reported cost is 
less than or equal to the hurdle. However, if the subordinate’s cost report exceeds the hurdle, the 
project is rejected. Antle and Eppen’s (1985) proposed hurdle contract depends on the 
assumption that the superior can credibly commit, ex ante, to upholding the hurdle contract 
(Brink et al. 2018). It may be difficult to expect a superior to uphold a hurdle contract without 
implementing automated processes, because the superior must commit to an irrational action 
(i.e., the hurdle contract essentially requires the superior to reject profitable budgets). One 
method to impose commitment to a hurdle would be use of slack allowance thresholds 
implemented through a monitoring system.  
Limited research has investigated the use of hurdle contracts. Evans et al. (2001) examine 
a hurdle rate contract enforced by the experiment’s software, which they label a Modified Trust 
Contract (MTC). They find that MTC use results in lower levels of honesty compared to a trust 
contract, but superiors achieve higher profits. Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2003) compare an 
automated hurdle contract to a non-binding hurdle contract that allows superiors discretion over 
acceptance or rejection of cost reports. Similar to Evans et al. (2001), they find that firm profit is 
greater under a hurdle rate contract. However, increased profit comes at the cost of subordinate 
honesty. Subordinates tend to report the maximum slack allowed by the hurdle rate rather than 
reporting honestly. This research suggests that hurdle rates reframe the budgeting setting so it 
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decreases emphasis on subordinate motivations such as honesty and increases emphasis in 
conforming to the mandated level of slack permitted by the hurdle rate. 
We extend this literature by examining the use of materiality thresholds imposed 
automatically via a monitoring system. Such thresholds essentially create hurdle rates for slack 
creation if a review of the subordinate’s cost report occurs. However, our setting deviates from 
prior literature in that there is uncertainty in each period as to whether an audit will occur, and 
uncertainty regarding the exact threshold imposed by the system (i.e., the slack allowance). 
Rather than providing an exact level of slack permitted by the threshold, the system 
communicates to the participant that the threshold will be more or less strict. As such, 
subordinates have some information about the potential presence of a threshold but must learn 
the exact nature of this threshold as is the case in prior literature, where the superior has rejection 
authority.  
Taking prior literature into account, we predict that subordinates will adjust their budget 
reports in response to the presence of the slack allowed by the system. Specifically, we expect 
the potential for review combined with the presence of a limit to slack allowed will shift 
subordinates’ focus from honesty concerns to fear of rejection, leading them to strategically 
determine what slack they will be allowed to report. In general, this would suggest that slack 
creation should decrease as the level of slack allowed by the system decreases. However, 
uncertainty regarding whether or not a control will be imposed and uncertainty regarding the 
exact level of the slack that will be allowed may interfere with subordinates’ conformance with 
this prediction. Further, as discussed earlier, the imposition of controls can lead to negative 
reciprocity which may cause subordinates to respond negatively to slack allowances perceived to 
be overly strict. Finally, prior literature demonstrates that increases in control precision do not 
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always lead to corresponding increases in honesty (Hannan et al. 2006; Newman 2014). Thus, 
there is the potential for subordinates’ preference for honesty to play a larger role when slack 
allowances are less strict. Given this tension from prior literature, we pose the following research 
questions: 
RQ1: Will subordinates subject to low levels of slack allowance engage in less slack 
creation than will subordinates subject to high levels of slack allowance? 
RQ2: Will subordinates’ reactions to changes in monitoring frequency (increased vs. 
decreased) differ when the level of slack allowance is high as compared to when 
the level of slack allowance is low? 
III. METHOD 
Task 
 To test our hypotheses and research questions, we conducted a laboratory experiment 
utilizing economic incentives. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) 
and conducted at the Experimental Laboratory for Economics and Business Research at Virginia 
Commonwealth University. Participants were assigned the role of manager of a hypothetical 
company. In this role, they reported costs to the corporate headquarters for two sets of 12 
decision rounds (24 decision rounds total). In each round, participants received private 
information about their actual costs, which ranged from $5 to $25. Costs for each period were 
randomly preselected to control for differences in costs across treatment groups. Participants 
were allowed to report any cost equal to or greater than their actual costs up to the maximum of 
$25. Any costs reported in excess of their actual costs constitute budgetary slack. Specifically, 
participants received the following information: 
 You will now assume the role of a regional production manager for Banner's Widget 
Company. As manager you will receive private information about your actual costs for 
the period. Actual costs will range between $5 and $25. Headquarters knows that costs 
range between $5 and $25, but headquarters will not know your actual costs.  
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Therefore, you must report your costs to Headquarters. Headquarters will transfer the 
amount reported to you. If you report costs higher than your actual costs, this will result 
in excess money being sent to you from Headquarters.  
For each round’s initial earnings calculations, participants received a $4 base salary plus any 
budgetary slack created. Therefore, as with many prior studies (e.g., Brink, Coats, and Rankin 
2017; Douthit and Stevens 2015; Evans et al. 2001; Newman 2014; Rankin, Schwartz, and 
Young 2008), subordinates have monetary incentives to create budgetary slack. The base salary 
ensured that participants would have positive earnings for the period even if they elected not to 
create budgetary slack. 
 Conditional upon the treatment, some costs reports were selected for review. If a review 
occurred, any costs reported in excess of actual costs (i.e., slack) were compared to the level of 
slack deemed acceptable by the company (i.e., slack allowance). If the slack exceeds the slack 
allowance, then any earnings from slack were withdrawn from the participant’s earnings for the 
decision round. However, participants retained their $4 base salary for the round. The frequency 
of monitoring and slack allowance were manipulated independent variables (details provided in 
the next section). Participants’ range of possible earnings in each decision round ranged from a 
minimum of $4 (base salary only) to $24 (actual costs of $5 with maximum slack created by 
reporting costs of $25). Participants were paid for one randomly selected round from each of the 
two sets of 12 decision rounds. Participants also received a fixed show-up fee of $5. 
Independent Variables  
There are five experimental conditions resulting from a 2x2+1 design. The change in 
monitoring frequency (increase vs. decreased) and slack allowance (high vs. low) were 
manipulated between participants. In addition, observations were collected for a control cell 
where there was no review of cost reports.  
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Change in Monitoring Frequency  
The change in monitoring frequency (increased vs. decreased) was manipulated between 
participants. For the increased frequency treatment, reviews occurred with low frequency (25 
percent of rounds reviewed) in the first set of 12 decision rounds and with high frequency (75 
percent of rounds reviewed) in the second set of 12 decision rounds. Participants in the decreased 
frequency treatment experienced 12 high monitoring frequency rounds before the 12 low 
monitoring frequency rounds.  
To introduce the monitoring frequency manipulation, participants were provided the 
following information before the first set of 12 decision rounds: 
Recently, Headquarters has implemented a new system that randomly selects some costs 
reports for review. Not all periods will be reviewed.  
Following this statement, the instructions provided information about the slack allowance 
(described in the next section). To introduce the change in frequency, participants received the 
following information before the second set of 12 decision rounds:  
 Headquarters has decided to make an adjustment to the review process. Specifically, the 
frequency of random reviews will be decreased {increased}. Therefore, you will 
experience less {more} periods where your cost report is reviewed. All other features of 
your reporting process will remain the same. 
Slack Allowance 
The slack allowance was manipulated between participants at two levels: low (25 percent 
of the slack available in a round allowed) and high (75 percent of the slack available in a round 
allowed). Slack allowance was held constant across all decision rounds in an experimental 
session. To introduce the slack allowance, manipulation participants were provided the following 
information before the first set of 12 decision rounds: 
 Headquarters is willing to accept a relatively low {relatively high} level of excess cost 
reporting. Therefore, Headquarters has set a maximum level that it deems as acceptable 
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for excess cost reports. You do not know Headquarters' maximum level of acceptable 
excess costs.  
For each period in which a review is conducted, the system checks your reported costs 
against your actual costs for the period. If you reported higher costs than your actual 
costs, the system will provide a red flag if the excess costs reported are higher than the 
maximum level Headquarters is willing to tolerate. If a red flag is triggered, any excess 
costs you reported will be removed from your earnings for the period. 
The exact calculation of slack allowance was not provided to prevent participants from simply 
calculating an amount they could report that would always be accepted.  
Dependent Variables 
 The primary dependent variable of interest, Average % Slack, is the slack created by 
participants scaled by the slack available. Specifically, we calculate Average % Slack as follows: 
(Cost Reported – Actual Costs) / ($25-Actual Costs). 
Following each set of decision rounds, we gathered participants’ perceptions of the 
monitoring system by asking for their level of agreement with the following statements: (1) I feel 
that Headquarters trusts me as an employee; (2) I feel that the budgetary review function is in the 
best interests of the company; (3) I think the review process put in place by Headquarters is fair; 
and (4) The chance of a review impacted my willingness to report costs that were higher than my 
actual costs. Participants responded to each statement on a seven-point scale where one = 
Strongly Disagree, and seven = Strongly Agree.  
Understanding Checks, Manipulation Checks, Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
Participants responded to understanding checks throughout the experimental instructions 
to ascertain whether they understood key elements of the instructions. Specifically, we tested 
participants’ understanding of how the creation of slack impacted their earnings in each period, 
how Headquarters described the slack allowance, and whether the number of reviews would 
increase or decrease in the second set of decision rounds. Any misunderstandings about these 
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key features of the experiment were corrected before participants were allowed to continue to the 
decision rounds. At the conclusion of the experiment, participants completed a post-experimental 
questionnaire that included additional questions testing participants’ perceptions of the 
experiment and a series of demographic questions.  
IV. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Using the university’s Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE), 
we recruited 123 student participants; 63 percent were female. To test that our instructions were 
clear and that manipulations were successful, we asked several understanding check questions 
during the experiment and did not proceed until all participants demonstrated an understanding 
of the key information underlying the experimental manipulations and how their earnings were 
calculated.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our variables of interest. Across all 
participants and all rounds, the mean Average % Slack was 55.7 percent (standard deviation = 
0.221), indicating that participants only attempted to take a little more than half the slack 
available on average. For the control cell, where there was no slack monitoring, the mean 
Average % Slack was 61.7 percent (standard deviation = 0.337). An untabulated test indicates 
that the Average % Slack created for all rounds was marginally higher (t = 1.368, p = 0.087, one-
tailed) for the control than for the treatment cells, which had a mean Average % Slack of 54.47% 
(standard deviation = 0.189). 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Monitoring Frequency Change and Slack Allowance 
Table 2 presents the results of a repeated measures analysis of the effect of Frequency 
Change and Slack Allowance on the Average % Slack created in each of the two sets of decision 
rounds. The repeated dependent measure, Decision Set, is the Average % Slack for the first set of 
12 decision rounds and the second set of 12 decision rounds. Panel A reports the tests of within-
subjects effects. The significance of Decision Set (F = 7.302, p = 0.008) indicates that the 
Average % Slack for rounds 1-12 and rounds 13-24 is significantly different across treatments. 
Further, Decision Set interacts significantly with Frequency Change (F = 4.155, p = 0.044) and 
Slack Allowance (F = 4.481, p = 0.037). Panel B of Table 2 reports the tests of between-subjects 
effects. The analysis indicates that Slack Allowance (F = 11.773, p = 0.001) and the interaction 
between Frequency Change and Slack Allowance (F = 5.744, p = 0.018) significantly affect 
Average % Slack created. However, the main effect for Frequency Change is not significant (F = 
0.109, p = 0.742). Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the patterns underlying the observed 
interaction effects, and Table 3 presents the underlying cell means and simple effects.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Figure 1 illustrates the treatment effects on Average % Slack across the two decision sets. 
When Slack Allowance is low, participants’ slack creation does not change significantly between 
Rounds 1-12 and Rounds 13-24 for either Frequency Change treatment. Specifically, Table 3, 
Panel A reports that the mean Average % Slack did not differ significantly between rounds 1-12 
and rounds 13-24 under the Low Slack Allowance treatment when frequency increased (t = -
0.895, p = 0.380) or when frequency decreased (t = -1.26, p = 0.218). However, when Slack 
Allowance is high, participants’ slack creation increases between rounds 1-12 and rounds 13-24. 
This increase occurs whether monitoring frequency increases or decreases. Specifically, Table 3 
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Panel B reports that the mean Average % Slack is significantly higher in rounds 13-24 than in 
rounds 1-12 under the High Slack Allowance treatment when frequency increased (t = -2.263, p 
= 0.003) and when frequency decreased (t = -2.756, p = 0.011).  
This pattern of results allows us to address our hypotheses. First, H1 predicts that 
subordinates who experience an increase in monitoring frequency will respond by creating less 
slack than when monitoring frequency was lower. We do not find support for this hypothesis. 
Rather, we find no significant change in slack creation in the Low Slack Allowance treatment 
and an increase in slack creation for the High Slack Allowance treatment. Next, we present 
competing hypotheses for H2. Our results are consistent with H2a, which predicts that 
subordinates who experience a decrease in monitoring frequency will respond opportunistically 
and create more slack than when monitoring frequency was high. Consistent with H2a, we 
observe a significant increase in slack creation for both the Low and High Slack Allowance 
treatments.  
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 3 about here] 
RQ1 asks whether subordinates subject to low levels of slack allowance will engage in 
less slack creation than subordinates subject to high levels of slack allowance, and RQ2 asks 
whether the change in monitoring frequency will interact with slack allowance. While Table 2 
indicates a significant main effect of Slack Allowance, it must be interpreted in light of the 
significant interaction effects. Additional details underlying these interactions are demonstrated 
in Figure 2, which illustrates the treatment effects for each of the decision sets separately.  
Consistent with Table 2, Figure 2 illustrates that there is a significant interaction between 
Frequency Change and Slack Allowance in each Decision Set with the nature of the interaction 
differing between the two Decision Sets. In rounds 1-12, the Average % Slack in the High 
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Frequency, Low Slack Allowance treatment is significantly lower than all other treatments (p-
values < 0.05, untabulated). In rounds 13-24, the Average % Slack for the Low Slack Allowance 
treatment is consistently lower slack than for the High Slack Allowance treatment (p-values < 
0.10, untabulated). The Average % Slack for the High Slack Allowance treatment is significantly 
lower when the monitoring frequency is high than when it is low (t = 2.593, p = 0.013, 
untabulated). Overall, this pattern of results reveals that in response to RQ1, subordinates subject 
to low levels of slack allowance engage in less slack creation than do subordinates subject to 
high levels of slack allowance in all cases except in the first 12 rounds when monitoring 
frequency is low.  
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Analysis of Round Effects 
 Table 4 presents the results of repeated measures analysis investigating the trends over 
each set of decision rounds. For both decisions sets, the within-subjects tests indicate that there is 
a significant round effect (p < 0.001) and an interaction between Frequency Change and Round 
(p < 0.10). However, the between-subjects tests for both decision sets are consistent with the 
results reported in Panel B of Table 2. Specifically, the between-subjects results indicate that 
Slack Allowance and the interaction between Frequency Change and Slack Allowance (F = 
significantly affect Average % Slack (p < 0.05), while the main effect for Frequency Change is 
not significant (p > 0.10). Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the Average % Slack by Round for 
each treatment group and indicate the rounds reviewed throughout the experiment.  




 We tested subordinates’ responses to changes in monitoring frequency and differing 
levels of slack allowance in an experimental setting. Results indicate an overall pattern consistent 
with the imposition of controls, causing participants to create slack strategically.  
In the first 12 rounds, slack creation is statistically different only for participants in the 
low slack allowance, high monitoring frequency treatment. Participants in this cell appeared to 
learn to reduce slack in response to the first two reviews (see Figure 3). This lower level of slack 
persisted for the remainder of the experiment, even when monitoring frequency decreased in 
rounds 13-24 (see Figure 4). This suggests that by imposing sufficiently strict monitoring 
penalties frequently in early periods, companies may be able to set a pattern of conservative 
subordinate behavior that persists even if the company subsequently reduces monitoring.  
Participants who experienced low slack allowance with increased monitoring frequency 
created an equivalent amount of slack as participants who had a high slack allowance in the first 
12 rounds. However, the increase in monitoring frequency in rounds 13-24 prevented them from 
increasing their slack creation.  
A different pattern of results occurs when slack allowance is high. Specifically, 
subordinates in the high slack allowance treatments significantly increase slack creation between 
rounds 1-12 and rounds 13-24 even when monitoring frequency increases. For participants in the 
increased monitoring frequency treatment, the higher level of monitoring frequency in rounds 
13-24 dampens, but does not halt, this increase in slack creation. It appears that participants in 
the high allowance treatments were slowly learning the exact nature of the cut-off for acceptable 
slack. Consistent with research on hurdle rates (Evans et al. 2001; Rankin et al. 2003), it appears 
that the slack allowance reframes the budgeting setting so it decreases emphasis on subordinate 
20 
 
motivations such as honesty and increases emphasis in conforming to the mandated level of slack 
permitted.  
Further, we find no evidence that participants will positively reciprocate by reducing 
slack in return for decreased monitoring frequency. Rather, participants in the high allowance, 
decreased monitoring frequency treatment exhibited the highest slack creation of all conditions 
in rounds 13-24. These participants may have been exhibiting negative reciprocity in response to 
the high monitoring frequency of the first 12 rounds, or they may simply have been strategically 
focused on maximizing their personal wealth. In either scenario, honesty preferences appear to 
have been crowded out by other concerns.    
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Rounds 1-12 Rounds 13-24
Figure 1. Average % Slack by Treatment 
Low Slack Allowance, Increased Frequency
Low Slack Allowance, Decreased Frequency
High Slack Allowance, Increased Frequency
High Slack Allowance, Decreased Frequency
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Figure 3. Average % Slack for Rounds 1-12
Low Slack Allowance, Low Frequency (Increased) Low Slack Allowance, High Frequency (Decreased)
High Slack Allowance, Low Frequency (Increased) High Slack Allowance, High Frequency (Increased)


































Figure 4. Average % Slack for Rounds 13-24
Low Slack Allowance, High Frequency (Increased) Low Slack Allowance, Low Frequency (Decreased)
High Slack Allowance, High Frequency (Increased) High Slack Allowance, Low Frequency (Increased)





     
  All Participants  Control 
 
n 123  21 
Average % Slack (Std. Dev) 55.70% (0.221)  61.70% (0.337) 
Average Net Earnings per 
Round (Std. Dev) $8.21 (2.354)  $10.53 (3.898) 
Average Total Payment (Std. 










n 25  26 
Average % Slack (Std. Dev) 53.32% (0.171)  56.94% (0.118) 
Average Net Earnings per 
Round (Std. Dev) $6.91 (1.094)  $8.33 (0.825) 
Average Total Payment (Std. 
Dev)  $19.48 (5.417)  $21.96 (4.142) 




n 26  25 
Average % Slack (Std. Dev) 43.76% (0.245)  64.18% (0.146) 
Average Net Earnings per 
Round (Std. Dev) $6.58 (1.495)  $9.16 (0.989) 
Average Total Payment (Std. 
Dev)  $17.35 (4.308)  $22.28 (4.996) 
Participants assumed the role of a manager who made a cost reporting decision to a hypothetical firm. Each 
participant made decisions in two sets of 12 decision rounds (24 total rounds). 
Variable Definitions:  
Average % Slack: The slack claimed/slack available, and ranges from 0 to 1. 
Frequency Change: The change in monitoring frequency was manipulated between subjects. When Frequency 
Change increased, participants experienced a low frequency of reviews in the set of decision rounds (25% of 
rounds reviewed) followed by a high frequency of reviews in the second set of decision rounds (75% of rounds 
reviewed). When Frequency Change decreased, participants experienced a high frequency of reviews in the 
first set of decision rounds (75% of rounds reviewed) followed by a low frequency of reviews in the second set 
of decision rounds (25% of rounds reviewed). 
Slack Allowance: Slack allowance was manipulated between participants at two levels: Low = 25% of the 
available slack was allowed if a round was reviewed, and High = 75% of the available slack was allowed if the 
round was reviewed.  
Average Net Earnings per Round is the average earnings per round. This amount is post-review if a review 
occurred. 
Average Total Payment is the average total payment each participant received. Participants were paid for one 
randomly selected period from each of the two sets of decision rounds. The lowest possible payment was $8 





Repeated Measures Test of Effects of Frequency Change and Slack Allowance on Average % 
Slack 
Panel A: Test of Within-Subjects Effects (n = 102)a 
Source of Variance df F p-value, two-tailed 
Decision Set 1 7.302 0.008 
Decision Set × Frequency Change 1 4.155 0.044 
Decision Set × Slack Allowance 1 4.481 0.037 
Decision Set × Frequency Change × Slack 
Allowance 1 0.047 0.828 
Error (Decision Set) 98   
Panel B: Test of Between-Subjects Effects (n = 102) 
Source of variance df F p-value, two-tailed 
Intercept 1 969.756 <0.001 
Frequency Change 1 0.109 0.742 
Slack Allowance 1 11.773 0.001 
Frequency Change × Slack Allowance 1 5.744 0.018 
Error 98   
a The repeated dependent measure, Decision Set, is the Average % Slack for the first set of 12 decision rounds and for 
the second set of 12 decision rounds. Tests indicate that the assumption of sphericity is met (Epsilon lower-bound = 
1.00). 
Variable Definitions:  
Average % Slack: The slack claimed/slack available, and ranges from 0 to 1. 
Frequency Change: The change in monitoring frequency was manipulated between subjects. When Frequency Change 
increased, participants experienced a low frequency of reviews in the set of decision rounds (25% of rounds 
reviewed) followed by a high frequency of reviews in the second set of decision rounds (75% of rounds reviewed). 
When Frequency Change decreased, participants experienced a high frequency of reviews in the first set of decision 
rounds (75% of rounds reviewed) followed by a low frequency of reviews in the second set of decision rounds (25% 
of rounds reviewed). 
Slack Allowance: Slack allowance was manipulated between participants at two levels: Low = 25% of the available 










Tests of Simple Effects for Average % Slack across Decision Sets 
Panel A: Low Slack Allowance Means (Standard Deviations) 
 Rounds 1-12  Rounds 13-24 
t 
(p-value, two-tailed) 
Increased Frequency  
(n = 25) 
Low (25% of periods 
reviewed) 
High (75% of periods 





(n = 26) 
High (75% of periods 
reviewed) 
Low (25% of periods 




Panel B: High Slack Allowance Means (Standard Deviations) 
 Rounds 1-12  Rounds 13-24 
t 
(p-value, two-tailed) 
Increased Frequency  
(n = 26) 
Low (25% of periods 
reviewed) 
High (75% of periods 





(n = 25) 
High (75% of periods 
reviewed) 






Panel C: Control / No Monitoring Means (Standard Deviations) 




(n = 21) 
No Reviews No reviews -1.954 
(0.065) 58.89% (0.335) 
64.51% 
(0.351) 
Variable Definitions:  
Average % Slack: The slack claimed/slack available, and ranges from 0 to 1. 
Frequency Change: The change in monitoring frequency was manipulated between subjects. When Frequency 
Change increased, participants experienced a low frequency of reviews in the set of decision rounds (25% of 
rounds reviewed) followed by a high frequency of reviews in the second set of decision rounds (75% of rounds 
reviewed). When Frequency Change decreased, participants experienced a high frequency of reviews in the 
first set of decision rounds (75% of rounds reviewed) followed by a low frequency of reviews in the second set 
of decision rounds (25% of rounds reviewed). 
Slack Allowance: Slack allowance was manipulated between participants at two levels: Low = 25% of the 
available slack was allowed if a round was reviewed, and High = 75% of the available slack was allowed if the 





Repeated Measures Analysis of Average % Slack by Round a 
Panel A: Rounds 1-12 
Source of Variance df F 
p-value, two-
tailed 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects    
Round 7.057 44.144 <0.001 
Round × Frequency Change 7.057 1.913 0.064 
Round × Slack Allowance 7.057 1.253 0.271 
Round × Frequency Change × Slack 
Allowance 7.057 0.888 0.516 
Between-Subjects Effects    
Frequency Change 1 1.442 0.233 
Slack Allowance 1 5.431 0.022 
Frequency Change × Slack Allowance 1 5.601 0.020 
Panel B: Rounds 13-24 
Source of variance df F 
p-value, two-
tailed 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects    
Round 5.484 18.988 <0.001 
Round × Frequency Change 5.484 4.983 <0.001 
Round × Slack Allowance 5.484 1.078 0.373 
Round × Frequency Change × Slack 
Allowance 5.484 0.826 0.541 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects    
Frequency Change 1 0.281 0.597 
Slack Allowance 1 14.813 <0.001 
Frequency Change × Slack Allowance 1 4.029 0.047 
a The repeated dependent measure, Round, is the Average % Slack for each decision round of the experiment. 
Tests indicate that the assumption of sphericity is not met (Rounds 1-12: Epsilon lower-bound = 0.091, 
Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon = 0.642; Rounds 13-24: Epsilon lower-bound = 0.091, Greenhouse-Geisser 
Epsilon = 0.499). Accordingly, the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected results are presented for the within-subjects 
tests. 
Variable Definitions:  
Average % Slack: The slack claimed/slack available, and ranges from 0 to 1. 
Frequency Change: The change in monitoring frequency was manipulated between subjects. When Frequency 
Change increased, participants experienced a low frequency of reviews in the set of decision rounds (25% of 
rounds reviewed) followed by a high frequency of reviews in the second set of decision rounds (75% of 
rounds reviewed). When Frequency Change decreased, participants experienced a high frequency of reviews 
in the first set of decision rounds (75% of rounds reviewed) followed by a low frequency of reviews in the 
second set of decision rounds (25% of rounds reviewed). 
Slack Allowance: Slack allowance was manipulated between participants at two levels: Low = 25% of the 
available slack was allowed if a round was reviewed, and High = 75% of the available slack was allowed if 
the round was reviewed. 
 
